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This article examines the problem of fit caused by ‘hybrid torts’ for several contemporary, explanatory theories of tort 
law: those belonging to Ernest Weinrib, Robert Stevens, and John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky. The term 
hybrid tort is intended to capture a cause of action that is treated routinely by practitioners, judges and doctrinal 
jurists alike as a tort proper (even though its ingredients suggest that it is only part-tort and part something-else 
(like, for example, equity)). The central argument of the article is as follows. At tort law’s borders with other legal 
categories, there exists a range of hybrid actions that are widely acknowledged to be torts but which comprise a range 
of juridical components some of which are typical within tort law, and some of which are typical of some other legal 
category. This set of hybrid actions suggests that – whatever theoretical neatness might dictate – tort law’s boundaries 
are fuzzy and porous, not clearly defined and rigid. This fuzziness in the object of theorisation naturally casts doubt 
on the apple-pie neatness of the theories in view. In addition, the obvious response – that these juridically mixed 
causes of action are not proper torts (and therefore do not require explanation) – is shown to be unavailable the 
theorists whose work is examined given that each of them commits to explaining the law as it presents itself. Put 
differently: since the law as it presents itself clearly treats these hybrid actions as torts, they cannot be dismissed in 
this way. Nor, it is argued – for a combination of reasons that establish their practical significance – can these hybrid 




‘Legal, like natural divisions, however clear in their general outline, will be found on exact scrutiny to end in a 
penumbra’ (Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Common Law (Little, Brown & Co., 1881, 127)) 
 
‘[It is] a hopeless task to draw a sharp picture corresponding to the blurred [object]’ (Ludwig Wittgenstein, 






The aim of this article is to show that, taken together, certain torts – which I label ‘hybrid torts’ 
because they straddle two legal categories – pose a significant problem of fit for leading, 
explanatory theories of tort law in so far as they set out to explain tort law as a whole. The principal 
theories falling into this category are those belonging to Robert Stevens, Ernest Weinrib and John 
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky.1 
                                                          
* Lancaster University. Thanks are due to Sara Fovargue, James Goudkamp, David Ibbetson, William Lucy and 
Andrew Tettenborn for input into various drafts. Thanks, too, are owed to the anonymous referees who saved me 
from making several errors. 
1 Weinrib’s most accessible account of tort law is relatively short and can be found in EJ Weinrib, ‘Understanding 
Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso Univ L Rev 485. Large chunks of this article are replicated, almost word for word, in 
Weinrib’s principal work, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harv UP 1995). Since the book (which is mainly 
about tort law) expands on certain matters discussed in that article, reference is made hereafter to both sources. 
Stevens, in his Torts and Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2008) leaves virtually no aspect of the subject untreated: he is clearly 
concerned to present a theory of tort law as a whole. The same ambition can be attributed to Goldberg and Zipursky’s 
examination of tort law over a long period of time (but for a general conspectus of which, see JCP Goldberg and BC 
Zipursky, ‘Torts as Wrongs’ (2010) 88 Tex L Rev 917). Partly for reasons of limited space, and partly because much of 
what they say either chimes with Weinrib’s pioneering work or that of my other target  theorists, I do no more than 
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It is fairly obvious that any given tort deserves to be explained (or, at least, ought not to be 
ignored) by a theory which sets out to provide an explanatory account of all of tort law if the tort in 
question cannot be seen as anomalous, marginal or trivial. A tort will be none of these if it is well-
entrenched, if its credentials qua tort have never seriously been challenged by either judges or 
jurists,2 and if it possesses considerable practical significance (on account of its being invoked 
regularly by litigants). If a putatively explanatory theory of tort law cannot account for well 
established, widely recognised and practically significant torts, then that theory may fairly described 
as being beset by a significant problem of fit.3  
What is perhaps less obvious is why the array of ‘hybrid torts’ upon which this article focuses 
should also require explanation by such theories and why, when they cannot be so explained, they 
should be thought of as presenting a significant problem of fit for those theories. The simple 
reason why they ought to be explained by the theories in view is that the relevant theorists all 
implicitly commit themselves to providing such explanation.  
That Weinrib is committed to explaining all causes of action that are widely recognised as 
being torts cannot be doubted given the method underpinning his theory. He makes clear that ‘the 
point of departure for theorizing about tort law – as well as anything else – is experience’ since, 
crucially, such ‘experience allows us to recognize a tort issue’.4 For him, ‘[a]n inquiry into the nature 
of tort law is … a visit to the familiar landmarks of our legal world’5 which involves ‘drawing on 
what is salient in juristic experience’,6 and in particular, ‘the experience of those who are lawyers’.7 In 
other words, if a particular action comprises a ‘familiar landmark’ within the world of tort law, this 
is good reason for it to be treated as an object of theorization. 
Stevens is similarly committed. On more than one occasion in Torts and Rights he makes plain 
his determination to explain ‘the law as we find it’;8 and as we shall see, the law as we find it 
(whether ideally or not) most certainly treats hybrid torts as part of tort law. They ought therefore 
to come within the compass of his theory. 
Finally, Goldberg and Zipursky, are no less tethered to popular conceptions of tort law in 
developing their theory. They expressly adopt the Hartian position that a legal system (or body of 
rules) can best be understood from what Hart labelled the ‘internal point of view’ or ‘internal 
aspect of rules’.9 Signing up to this internal point of view, they insist that the ‘first move in an 
effort to theorize a subject is to work with, rather than dismiss as empty, the ways in which those 
                                                          
refer here and there to the recent theories of tort law propounded by Allan Beever (A Theory of Tort Liability (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2016)) and Arthur Ripstein (Priavte Wrongs (Cambridge, Mass: Harv UP, 2016)).    
2 There is implicit acknowledgement of this in the fact that leading tort theorists do not generally ignore the data that 
they cannot explain. So, for example, Beever explores a number of possible ways in which inducing breach of contract 
might be understood before concluding that it is an anomalous cause of action (Beever (n 1) 146-154. Similarly, Stevens 
devotes considerable effort to explaining why several exceptions to the privity of torts rule in which he places so mush 
store can be overlooked or tolerated even though they cannot be accommodated by his theory (Stevens (n 1) ch 8). 
And Goldberg and Zipursky struggle hard (but ultimately fail) to bring within their theory the rule concerning ultra-
hazardous activities (Goldberg and Zipursky (n 1) 952). 
3 Because torts that are well established and practically important are regarded as orthodox, there is no real scope for 
a tort theorist to dismiss them as aberrant or anomalous.  
4 Weinrib, (n 1) (Understanding Tort Law) 490. 
5 ibid. 
6 Weinrib (n 1) (Idea of Private Law) 2-3 (emphasis added). 
7 ibid 9. 
8 See, eg, Stevens (n 1) 74, 306. 
9 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, (Oxford: OUP, 1994) 89, 56. Though it matters not for present purposes, it may be 
noted that Goldberg and Zipursky actually run together two ideas that Hart treated as being separate. The ‘internal 
aspect of rules’, for Hart, is a property of rule-governed behaviour as opposed to habitual behaviour. By contrast, the 
‘internal point of view’ refers to the point of view of those whose behaviour and beliefs constitute the aspect of the 
social world we are attempting to understand (ie, the law). Taking up the internal point of view may, of course, lead 




acting within a practice make sense of it’.10 They, in other words, defend a strong prima facie case 
for regarding ‘tort law to be what it appears to be’11 and thereby presumptively undertake to explain 
those actions – including hybrid torts – which are generally taken to constitute part of tort law.   
 It is perhaps worth spelling out here why hybrid torts present a particular problem of fit 
for explanatory theories. The plausibility of each of my target theories is intimately linked to the 
idea that tort law has clearly defined and rigid borders. Without such borders, there is an 
inescapable problem which besets such theories. It is this. If the boundaries between tort law and 
other legal categories are indistinct, or if they are porous, then the very idea that there exists a 
discrete body of law to which the theory in question applies, and against which that theory may be 
tested, is called into question. In short: blurred boundaries carry with them unavoidable 
ramifications for the explanatory ambitions of the theorists in view given Wittgenstein’s 
observation (quoted above) that it is impossible to paint a clear picture of a fuzzy object.  
Now of course, not all torts are equally well entrenched, and the practical significance of 
some torts is undoubtedly dwarfed by that of others. From this emerges one ostensibly attractive 
escape route for the tort theorist who finds herself confronted by the problem of fit posed by 
hybrid torts. The escape route involves showing that the hybrid torts are anomalies, or otherwise 
insignificant causes of action. Either way, the action in question can be portrayed as something 
which need not be explained, for there is no need to account for actions that are not proper torts, 
or actions that are mere trivial exceptions to the norm. As we shall see, however, no such escape 
route can plausibly be invoked in relation to the hybrid torts considered in this article. They are all 
too firmly entrenched and/or significant to be side-lined. Any attempt to dismiss the actions in 
question as something other than torts involves a flagrantly Procrustian approach to theorisation. 
The claim that hybrid torts X, Y and Z fall outside tort’s clear and rigid borders is an unpersuasive 
assertion of convenience, contradicted by the conception of these actions held by judges and jurists 
alike. 
The article proceeds as follows. In section II, I set out three key claims made by all of my 
target theorists which clash in some profound way with the various hybrid torts I consider. In turn, 
they are the claims that tort law is (1) necessarily bilaterally structured, (2) exclusively part of private 
law, and (3) categorically different from other branches of private law. In section III, I explain fully 
what I mean by hybrid torts. In particular, I highlight how they come into existence and illustrate 
the classificatory problems that they are apt to cause. In section IV, I address another prefatory 
issue: the matter of when and why certain types of legal category ought, in theory, to be discrete. The 
matter is discussed in order to make the important point that not all legal categories are alike, and 
that only certain types of legal category ought in principle to be distinct from other, neighbouring 
categories within the same classificatory scheme. I then show that tort law is one such category 
which should, in theory, be distinct from other legal categories.  
In section V – having established the theoretical position – I demonstrate how, in practice, 
things are very different. I do this by identifying a range of hybrid torts which serve to blur tort 
law’s boundaries with a number of neighbouring categories. In section VI, I argue that because 
these actions are routinely treated as torts, they have important ramifications for my target theories. 
The fact that in practice there are no firm borders between tort law and other legal categories 
makes it difficult to accept any explanatory theory which proceeds from the assertion or 
assumption that such rigid borders exist. In section VII, I consider a superficially compelling 
objection to my reaching this conclusion. The article then ends with a series of concluding remarks 
in section VIII. 
 
  
II Three Shared Claims 
                                                          
10 JCP Goldberg and BC Zipursky, ‘Seeing Tort from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties’ 





I make the assumption that anyone who has chosen to read this article is likely to be fairly familiar 
with the main elements of the theories propounded by Weinrib, Stevens and Goldberg and 
Zipursky. As such, instead of offering a summary of their core claims, I limit myself here to picking 
out three core claims that are common to each of the theories in view. I alight upon these claims 




A Tort Law’s Bipolarity 
 
All of my target theorists subscribe to the view that tort law is characterised in part by its bilateral 
structure: the idea, that is, that torts link two, and only two, parties (the claimant and the 
defendant). In each of their hands, though the terminology varies, this two-party characteristic is 
elevated to the status of structural imperative. For Weinrib, the phenomenon is described in terms 
of tort law’s bipolarity.12 Stevens prefers the term privity;13 while Goldberg and Zipursky express 
the structural imperative in terms of ‘relational wrongdoing’.14 But whichever term is used, the core 
claim is just the same.  
There is scarcely a page of chapter 3 of Weinrib’s principal work, The Idea of Private Law, 
which does not mention his commitment to the idea that corrective justice operates in relation to 
purely bipolar relationships. And in a subsequent chapter, he goes on to assert that ‘corrective 
justice necessarily connects two parties, no more and no less’.15 Likewise, Stevens is adamant that 
in tort, ‘[t]he only person who can enforce a right is the right-holder, and persons who suffer loss 
because of the infringement of someone else’s right do not have standing to sue.’16 Finally, 
Goldberg and Zipursky reveal their attachment to the structural imperative in their treatment of 
the judgment of Cardozo CJ in Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co.17 Invoking what was said in that 
case, they put the matter this way: ‘a tort plaintiff “sues in her own right for a wrong personal to 
her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another.”’18 At the heart of this 
claim is their insistence that the wrongs of tort law must be ‘personal to’ the claimant. Put 
otherwise, torts involve the breach of a legal duty owed by defendant X to claimant Y. It is not enough 
that X has in some basic (moral) sense acted wrongfully. Nor is it enough that X has simply caused 
harm or loss to Y by virtue of his volitional conduct. For an act to be tortious, they insist, it must 
been wrongful in the hands of X and towards Y (or a class of persons to which Y belongs) given 
that ‘[t]he wrongs of tort law spring from relational directives’.19 
 
 
B Tort Law is Exclusively a Branch of Private Law 
 
A second claim common to all of the theories in view is that tort law belongs exclusively to the 
private law domain. This conception of tort law is fundamental to the theory advanced in Weinrib’s 
The Idea of Private Law. In his view, the public/private divide is reflected in two incompatible modes 
                                                          
12 Weinrib, for example, maintains that ‘so far as corrective justice is concerned, the norms of tort law – and indeed 
of private law more generally reflect… the bipolar structure of private law’: EJ Weinrib, ‘Deterrence and Corrective 
Justice’ (2002-3) 50 UCLA Law Rev 621, 623. 
13 Stevens (n 1) ch 8. 
14 See, eg, JCP Goldberg and BC Zipursky (n 1) 960: ‘The duty-imposing norms of tort law are relational norms’. 
15 Weinrib (n 1) (Idea of Private Law) 175. 
16 Stevens (n 1) 173. 
17 162 NE 99, 100 (NY 1928). 
18 Goldberg and Zipursky (n 1) 958. They go on to claim that in tort, ‘rights of action are generated only in those who 
have been wronged’: ibid 960. 
19 BC Zipursky, ‘Civil Recourse and the Plurality of Wrongs: Why Torts are Different’ [2014] NZLR 145, 149. 
5 
 
of ordering: corrective justice and distributive justice. Private law is animated by the former, while 
public law is animated by the latter.20 Stevens, likewise, believes that ‘[t]orts belong within private 
law’.21 He reinforces the point by reference to the way in which crimes that have tort law 
counterparts (like battery) can be distinguished from those tortious counterparts. While the former 
are characterised by ‘a duty owed to society in general (crimes)’ the latter involve the ‘breach of a 
duty owed to individual members of society (torts)’.22 And it is because torts are characterised by 
such private duties (and their correlative rights) that Stevens sees tort law as belonging exclusively 
to the domain of private law.23  
Just the same belief can be found in Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory of tort law. They state 
openly that there is something ‘distinctively “private” about tort’24 and that ‘we conceive of torts 
as private wrongs’.25  
 
 
C  Tort Law is a Discrete Legal Category 
 
All of the theorists whose work is examined here consider tort law to be a discrete legal category, 
even though there is considerable disagreement among them as to whether or not the law is unified 
by a single organising concept.26 They all agree that there is a fundamental distinction to be drawn 
between tort and its nearest neighbour, contract, along the lines that tortious obligations are 
imposed upon the parties whereas contractual obligations are created by them.27 Equally, all agree 
that tort law is categorically distinct, not just from contract, but from other, familiar branches of 
private law, such as unjust enrichment and equity. Stevens, for example, states unequivocally that 
‘the law of torts is …. [a] basic category’,28 and he elaborates upon its separation from other legal 
categories in these terms: 
  
‘Torts’ is a catch-all category of ‘other wrongs’. It is the category of wrongs which are not breaches of 
contract or equitable wrongs. Breach of contract has conceptual unity. The category of equitable wrongs is 
unified by their historical provenance in the chancery division of the High Court. Torts has no unity other 
than that it is what is left after the other two categories of wrongs are excluded.29 
 
Although he says no more about the difference between tort and equity, Stevens, does reiterate 
elsewhere in Torts and Rights his commitment to the idea that tort law is categorically separate from 
                                                          
20 The claim is implicitly rather than explicitly made: see Weinrib (n 1) (Idea of Private Law) 73-4.  For details of this 
implicit claim, which relies on various express claims made here and there which need to be stitched together, see W 
Lucy, ‘What’s Private about Private Law’ in A Robertson and TH Wu (eds), The Goals of Private Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2009) 52-58.  
21 Stevens (n 1) 284. 
22 ibid. 
23 ibid. 
24 Goldberg and Zipursky (n 1) 919.  
25 ibid. 
26 Kantians, of course, believe that there is such a concept: corrective justice. Other theorists, like Stevens, Goldberg 
and Zipursky do not commit on this front. They instead centre their accounts upon the structural phenomenon of 
rights infringements (or wrongs, as they often prefer to call them).  
27 In the language of some prominent rights theorists, contract, but not tort law, is the law of ‘consensually defined 
duties’: Goldberg and Zipursky (n 1) 919. Stevens, another rights theorist, also emphasises the fact that, unlike 
contractual promises, torts do not generate primary rights: Stevens (n 1) 287. By contrast, the corrective justice theorist, 
Ernest Weinrib highlights the fact that ‘the difference between tort law and contract law lies in the origin of the right’ 
adding that ‘[i]n tort law [but not contract] the plaintiff’s right exists independently of the defendant’s action’: Weinrib 
(n 1) (Idea of Private Law) 136. This shared emphasis on the fact that D’s conduct is the source of the relevant right in 
contract is hard to square with the fact that many contractual obligations are non-consensually imposed, such as 
statutory implied terms and terms implied as a matter of common law. 
28  R Stevens, ‘Private Rights and Public Wrongs’ in M Dyson (ed), Unravelling Tort and Crime (Cambridge: CUP, 2014) 
144. 
29 Stevens (n 1) 286. 
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contract. ‘The law of torts is’ he says, ‘quite different from the law of contract which [is]… a unity 
concerned with one primary right arising for one reason: agreement’.30  
In strikingly similar terms to Stevens, Goldberg and Zipursky also assert that ‘[t]ort is indeed 
a basic category of law’.31 It is one, they say, of just ‘a handful of fundamental legal categories, such 
as Contracts, Property and Criminal Law’.32 They not only see tort as one fundamental part of 
private law, but also as one that can be distinguished from the other such parts. They assert 
unequivocally ‘that torts … [are] different from breaches of contract’;33 and then they move on to 
explain, more expansively, that tort can also be distinguished from equity in the following way: 
 
‘Tort law empowers the plaintiff to obtain redress as against the defendant who wrongfully inflicted the 
“hit,” or injury… Equitable wrongs are a different kettle of fish…The [equity] plaintiff does not take a “hit”; 
she is not rendered less than intact. Rather, the wrong is a betrayal of trust…Tort’s wrongs lead the state to 
empower the plaintiff to demand and obtain from the defendant conduct that is responsive to the 
defendant’s wrongful injuring of the plaintiff. Equity’s wrongs lead the state to empower the plaintiff to 
demand and obtain from her fiduciary an accounting as to the fiduciary’s handling of the matters with which 
he has been entrusted... So, we can after all distinguish torts’.34 
  
Weinrib is just as insistent that tort law is a discrete part of private law. While he eschews the 
familiar language of ‘legal categories’, he nonetheless maintains that tort law, taken as a whole, is 
‘a mode of legal ordering’ such that ‘before we assess the soundness of any tort decision, we can 
recognize that it belongs to tort law rather than [for example] criminal law or administrative 
regulation’.35  In other words, for Weinrib, tort law is ‘a distinct mode of ordering’;36 one which 
possesses ‘features that are constitutive of our conception of tort law’.37 He states expressly what 
he perceives to be the key difference between contract and tort at some length: 
 
Both tort law and contact law rectify losses through corrective justice... [However] [t]he difference between 
tort law and contract law lies in the origin of the right.[38] In tort law the right exists independently of the 
defendant’s action; the damage award therefore aims at eliminating the effects on the plaintiff of D’s 
wrong. In contract law, the parties themselves create P’s right to D’s performance of the promised act; the 
damage award therefore gives P the value of that performance.39 
 
Relying heavily on the notion of ‘normative loss’ (as opposed to factual loss), Weinrib also explains 
at some length what he perceives to be the way in which tort law and unjust enrichment come 
                                                          
30 ibid 299. 
31 Goldberg and Zipursky (n 1) 918. 
32 ibid, 953. 
33 Goldberg and Zipursky (n 1) 920 (emphasis added). They also invoke regularly, throughout the paper, Prosser’s 
notion of torts as ‘wrongs other than breaches of contract’.  
34 JCP Goldberg and BC Zipursky, ‘Civil Recourse Revisited’ (2011) 39 Florida State Univ L Rev 341, 351. See also JCP 
Goldberg and HE Smith, ‘Wrongful Fusion: Equity and Tort’ in JCP Goldberg et al (eds), Equity and Law: Fusion and 
Fission (Cambridge: CUP, 2018) (forthcoming): ‘equity operates at the boundaries of tort law... [which] presupposes 
an account of tort as a body of law that actually has some boundaries. The key distinction between tort and equity is 
… [that] [t]ort law is for the most part ‘first-order’ law. It specifies, in relatively general terms, legal duties that we owe 
to one another… Equity is not conduct-guiding in this way… it is a gap-filling, second-order regime’. 
35 Weinrib (n 1) (Understanding Tort Law) 491.  
36 ibid 492 (emphasis added). 
37 EJ Weinrib, ‘The Special Morality of Tort Law’ (1989) 34 McGill LJ 403, 406. 
38 Typically, Kantians see innate rights as being the source of the particular rights protected by tort law. And the 
possible objection that tort law protects a good deal more than our innate rights – because, for example, there are 
several torts which protect proprietary rather than bodily interests – is typically met with the riposte that the 
defendant’s acting in a fashion that is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s proprietary rights can best be understood in 
terms of acting in a way that ‘is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s right to control or use the good [or other property]’: 
Beever (n 1), 74.  This right to pursue one’s own purposes by use of one’s property is also the nub of Arthur Ripstein’s 
very similar thesis: see Ripstein (n 1) 30-34 
39 Weinrib (n 1) (Idea of Private Law) 136. 
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apart.40 Though he does not specifically address the distinctions between tort law and other areas 
of private law, it nonetheless seems to follow from his characterisation of tort law as ‘a distinct 
mode of legal ordering’ that he sees tort law as having sharply defined borders. 
 
Taken together, the three claims to which all of my target theorists subscribe make it clear that 
they all believe tort law to be (i) structured bilaterally, (ii) part of private law, and (iii) within private 
law, a discrete legal category. Although they do not always spell out in detail the ways in which they 
perceive tort law to be separate from certain other legal categories, it is nonetheless apparent from 
what they do say that they think this way. The very fact that they each devote time and space to 
establishing the divide between tort and its closest neighbour, contract, tends to suggest (though it does 
not strictly entail) that they also believe there to be a rigid divide between tort law and its more 
remote neighbours (such as unjust enrichment and equity) with which it has a much less obvious 
connection or affinity.   
 
 
III Hybrid Torts  
 
When a novel case comes before the courts, judges sometimes create a new cause of action by 
drawing upon an array of inter-connected legal principles. These principles may be taken from 
cases that belong to different legal categories; yet, despite its mongrel heritage, the resulting cause of 
action is very often labelled a ‘tort’.41 Over time, it gets treated by practitioners, students and 
teachers of the law alike as though it were an entirely quotidian member of the ‘tort law’ family. 
But whether such actions deserve to be treated in this way – as though they were ‘thoroughbred’ 
torts – is a question that is seldom asked. As we will see, however, it is an important question for 
the purposes of assessing the merits of explanatory theories of tort law. To be clear, the critical 
matter is not whether tort law is capable of providing a home for such actions. It plainly is. Rather, 
the critical question is about how such hybrid torts ramify for explanatory theories.  
The problems that these actions cause for such theories arise because – in a metaphor to 
rival the idea that tort law can be seen as the common law’s Swiss army knife42 – tort law can also 
be seen as the common law’s vacuum cleaner. The metaphor is apt because it is generally tort – as 
opposed to contract, equity, unjust enrichment or any other legal category – that is called upon to 
house hybrid actions that are constructed from an array of principles found in cases that belong 
to different legal categories. Examples are in no short supply.43 
I can conveniently start with Lumley v Gye.44 This is nowadays almost invariably regarded as 
a tort case. Indeed, it is the very case in which the tort of inducing breach of contract was first 
properly launched.45 But a little reflection soon reveals that the case could just as plausibly have 
been classified as part of the law of contract: as a rule of accessory liability within contract law 
                                                          
40 Weinrib (n 1) 140-142. Two clear-cut situations involving unjust enrichment are identified: (i) cases in which there 
is no wrongful act on D’s part, but D nonetheless gains at C’s expense by virtue of a mistaken payment; and (ii) cases 
in which, although D has acted wrongfully, the claim in unjust enrichment is ‘the mirror image’ of the typical tort 
claim (since C suffers no factual loss but D has made a factual gain).    
41 A prime example is the action for misuse of private information minted in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, 
and discussed at length in Section V, below.  
42 A Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 197. 
43 For discussion of many more than are considered in this article, see S Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories 
and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal Reasoning (Cambridge: CUP, 2002) passim. And for an example of an area of law – 
ie, undue influence – in which a home in equity is preferred to tort, see Stevens (n 28) who writes (at 125) that, ‘[w]here 
one party deliberately exploits the hold they have over another by virtue of their relationship of excessive influence, this 
can and does constitute a form of wrongdoing, what [sic] but for its history in equity would be called a tort’. 
44 (1853) 2 El & Bl 216. 
45 An analogous yet older cause of action – for enticement of a servant – had existed since the 14th Century. This 
however was of very limited scope and certainly not a close approximation to modern tort of inducing breach of 
contract: see D Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford: OUP, 1999) 66. 
8 
 
according to which the duty to make reparation for loss arising from a breach of contract is 
extended beyond the immediate contract breaker to the person who procured that breach.46 Tort 
law contains several rules of accessory liability.47 Why should contract law not do likewise? 
Certainly, Erle J came very close to saying that it should do so when he declared in Lumley that: ‘he 
who procures the wrong … may be sued, either alone or jointly with the agent, in the appropriate action 
for the wrong complained of’?48 Critical here are the words, ‘jointly … in the appropriate action for the 
wrong complained of’, for this suggests a rule of ‘contract law’ which mirrors tort law’s rules on 
concurrent tortfeasance. Paul Davies appears to adopt this understanding. He contends that, 
‘[l]liability under Lumley should not be crammed under the umbrella of the economic torts’, and 
that it better seen as a particular instance of accessory liability belonging ‘[i]n the contractual 
context’.49 So why does this classificatory difficulty matter from the perspective of contemporary 
tort theory? It matters for at least three reasons. 
First, Lumley helps illuminate the fact that tort law as it presents itself is not the sharply defined 
body of law that explanatory theories proclaim it to be. More specifically, Lumley casts doubt on 
the idea that tort law has discrete and non-porous boundaries by virtue of the fact that the relevant 
wrong in that case was a breach of contract, while the action as a whole lay in tort.50 It cannot 
plausibly be argued that the relevant wrong was the breach of a free-standing duty not to induce 
the breach of contract, for the reasons that follow.  
One possible source of such a duty would be the contract itself. The making of a contract 
by X and Y might be thought to generate an obligation that binds Z not to induce breach thereof. 
But this cannot be right. For, any such duty created by the contract would ostensibly be contractual 
in nature and, as such, an action for breach thereof would lie in contract, not tort. Furthermore, 
and more fundamentally, it is trite to state that the privity of contract principle stands in the way 
of X and Y generating rights and duties that apply to parties other than themselves.  
Another, subtler way of establishing a direct duty owed by D to C relies on the idea that the 
contract’s formation generates a secondary, tortious (not contractual) duty not to induce a breach 
of the contract. Indeed, it is exactly this view that Stevens holds. He writes: ‘contracts carry with 
them a right good against everyone else that they do not induce the infringement of the contractual 
right’.51 However, this understanding – the nub of which is that there exists a freestanding tortious 
duty not to induce a breach of contract – is contradicted by authority. In the leading case of OBG 
Ltd v Allan52 their Lordships repeatedly stated that liability under Lumley v Gye is accessory not 
primary. Yet liability would be primary if there were any direct duty owed by D to C along the lines 
that he suggests.53 Given such weighty countervailing authority, and bearing in mind also the fact 
that no reported decision has ever lent support to the existence of such a duty owed by D to C, 
the inescapable truth remains that, what is key in a case of inducing breach of contract, is that 
quintessential touchstone of contractual liability – the breach of a contractual duty. The action is 
therefore hybrid in the sense that it mixes tortious and contractual touchstones of liability: it 
                                                          
46 Something close to this was said of inducing breach of contract in the now leading case of OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 
1 AC 1. The point is echoed in P Davies, Accessory Liability (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) ch 6. 
47 The most well-known is arguably the vicarious liability doctrine (depending on whether one prefers the master ’s 
tort or servant’s tort interpretation); but there are also rules on procurement, authorisation and ratification of torts 
which operate to like effect. See further, Davies, ibid.  
48 (1853) 2 El & Bl 216, 232 (emphasis added).  
49 Davies (n 46) 7. 
50 In AI Enterprises Ltd v Bram Enterprises Ltd [2014] 1 SCR 177, [80] Cromwell J (delivering judgement on behalf of the 
entire Supreme Court of Canada) spoke openly of ‘the tort of inducing a breach of contract’. So too was it treated as 
a tort in Drouillard v Cogeco Cable Inc 2007 ONCA 322, [13] (Rouleau JA); and there are repeated references to the 
‘Lumley v Gye Tort’ in the leading English case of OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1.  
51 Stevens (n 1) 281.    
52 [2008] 1 AC 1. 
53 It also follows from the fact that liability is secondary that we can reject the idea that the contractual rights held by 
X and Y are treated as a species of property with which Z is bound not to interfere. Interference with another’s 
property would also entail a form of primary liability. 
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combines the tort law requirement of intention with the need for a contractual duty that gets 
broken.54  
The second reason why Lumley is problematic for our target theorists is that it confounds 
the shared claim sketched earlier that torts are centred upon duties imposed by virtue of a rule of 
law. The only relevant duty for the purposes of the Lumley tort55 is, as we have just seen, the 
contractual duty in play. Since this duty is plainly generated by the parties’ agreement it must follow 
that the tort cannot be explained in terms of the breach of a duty imposed by law. Only if one 
dismisses what the courts have repeatedly said about liability being secondary rather than primary 
in this area can one begin to argue that Lumley liability is based on a duty imposed by law. But that, 
of course, involves an obvious departure from explaining the law as we find it.56 
The third reason why Lumley poses explanatory problems for the theorists in view is this. 
Inducing breach of contract breaks the structural imperative to which they all subscribe. That, 
recall, is that torts are bilaterally structured around private law rights held directly by C against D. 
As already noted, the language used to describe this feature varies. There is talk of bipolarity, 
relational wrongdoing, and the privity of torts. But the core claim is always the same: torts involve 
wrongs committed by D against C where the wrong in question entails the breach of a duty owed 
directly by D to C. The Lumley tort cannot be made to fit the structural imperative because the 
House of Lords were perfectly clear in explaining the three-party nature of the action in OBG Ltd 
v Allan.57  
Of course, the blushes of all our target theorists could be spared if, somehow, it could be 
shown that inducing breach of contract were somehow an exceptional, anomalous or unprincipled 
action precisely because it obfuscates (or violates) the putative boundary between contract and 
tort. If the Lumley tort could side-lined in this way, then our target theorists need not concern 
themselves with the fact that it clashes with core tenets of their theories. So, can it be dismissed as 
anomalous or sui generis? I suggest that it cannot.  
The mere fact that the action is rooted partly in the soil of contract law (since the relevant 
duty is contractual), and partly in that of tort law (since C must show intention), does not per se 
render it an anomaly. Many other actions have (or have had) affinities with both branches of the 
law. As long ago as the 14th Century, there was a class of cases that sounded in the tort of trespass 
which today would be regarded as cases of contractual mis-performance.58 And in the modern era, 
an action under section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 equally centres on mixed 
touchstones of liability. In terms that bear an obvious affinity with the reasonableness standard in 
the law of negligence, the Act requires that defendant should have made a false representation to 
the claimant in the absence of reasonable grounds for believing that what he said was true. At the 
same time, with an obvious link to contract law, the claimant must also have been induced to enter 
into a contract and suffered loss a result thereof. Lumley, in other words, is by no means alone in 
having mixed affinities. 
If we cannot plausibly regard Lumley as anomalous, we have little choice but to take seriously 
the idea that inducing breach of contract is best thought of as a hybrid tort, whose touchstones of 
                                                          
54 Breach of contract does not routinely require intention or carelessness: liability is ordinarily strict.  
55 Although in OBG their Lordships made clear that inducing breach of contract is a rule of accessory liability, they 
nonetheless repeatedly referred to it as the ‘Lumley v Gye Tort’.  For reasons of economy of expression, I simply say 
‘Lumley tort’. 
56 Both Beever and Stevens offer arguments about why the courts are mistaken in their description of the liability in 
the Lumley tort as secondary: see Beever (n 1) 108-9; Stevens (n 1) 275-8. However, all that they manage to show is 
that the form of secondary liability in the Lumley tort cannot be cashed out in terms that equate to existing forms of 
secondary liability. Nothing, in principle, stands in the way of the new forms of secondary liability. There is no single 
conception such liability. Procuring the commission of a tort, for example, involves a markedly different form of 
secondary liability than is engaged by the vicarious liability principle, or by the concept of assisting in the commission 
of a tort.  
57 [2008] 1 AC 1 at [8], [45]-[64], [270], [302] and [320]. 
58 For a fuller account, see Ibbetson (n 45) 43-48. And for the reason why there was never concurrent liability in 
contract and tort, see ibid 89.  
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liability are connected both to contract and to tort. But a single, mongrel common law action is 
not nearly enough to pose a substantial challenge for the theories in view. Were it the sole example, 
the relevant theorists could well seek to argue that tort law is sufficiently distinct from other legal 
categories for their theories to remain credible. We must, therefore, explore in some depth the 
question of whether legal categories can and do overlap to a significant degree (somewhat like the 
different sectors in a Venn diagram). As we shall see, many other well-established common law 
actions also serve to blur tort law’s boundaries in this way even though a respectable theoretical case 
can be made against their being able to do so. 
 But before turning to those matters, it is necessary to head off one possible objection to 
my using the concept of a hybrid tort to test the explanatory power of the theories I have chosen 
to examine. The objection runs as follows. There is a logical flaw in seeking to establish the 
existence of hybrid torts since the concept of a hybrid tort presupposes the existence of distinct 
legal categories. Without a clear ex-ante conception of, say, tort and equity, so the argument goes, 
it is meaningless to say that action X is a hybrid of tort and equity.  
Despite ostensible appeal, the objection is unfounded. This is because it is perfectly 
possible to speak of a hybrid of X and Y without settling quite what the difference between X and 
Y actually is. Biologists, for example, uniformly accept that it is possible to breed a hybrid of the 
domesticated horse (equus ferus caballus) and the nearly extinct Asian wild horse (equus ferus 
przewalskii). Yet what they cannot do is rely on this hybrid to prove the distinctiveness of the two 
parent species in the usual biological way, namely, the sterility of any offspring produced by inter-
breeding.59 By analogy, I think it is possible to speak meaningfully of hybrid torts without such 
torts being necessarily suggestive of the distinctiveness of the two legal categories.    
 We must now turn to the matter of porous boundaries between legal categories: first in 




IV Tort as a Discrete Legal Category: Theory 
 
The enterprise of dividing the law into categories is by no means novel. Blackstone made what is 
probably the most famous early attempt to classify English common law.60 For him, the aim of so 
doing was ‘to render the whole intelligible to the uninformed minds of beginners’.61 He saw the 
provision of ‘a general map of the law, marking out the shape of the country, its connections and 
boundaries, its greater divisions and principalities’ as a means by which the work of ‘an academical 
expounder of the laws’ could be facilitated.62 In short, he attributed an expository function to the 
enterprise of legal cartography (as did late nineteenth century treatise writers who were concerned 
by the ‘disorderly condition of the law’, and felt the need ‘to tidy it up, to systematise it’63).  
                                                          
59 The usual biological test of whether two closely-related animals belong to genuinely species turns on whether cross-
bred offspring are born sterile (like an ass, or a Liger). The offspring of these two equine species are not born sterile. 
So asserting that the parents belong to different species by reference to the ineluctable sterility of their offspring does 
not work. On the other hand, it is clear that the Asian wild horse (commonly known as Przewalksii’s horse) has an 
extra-chromosonal pairing. So it is possible to speak meaningfully of this type of horse even though it is not possible 
to say (in the conventional biological way) why it is different from the domesticated horse. For details of the difficulty 
associated with separating the two species, see EA Oakenfull et al, ‘Genetics of Equid Species and Subspecies’ 
(https://www.semanticscholar.org/author/E.-Ann-Oakenfull/4410213?sort=influence&page=2).  
60 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765-9). An earlier attempt to arrange 
the law systematically was made by Matthew Hale in The History and Analysis of the Common Law of England (London: 
Butterworths, 1820). 
61 ibid vol 1, 5. 
62 ibid. 
63 AWB Simpson, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature’ (1981) 
University of Chicago L Rev 632, 641. Neil Duxbury goes so far as to describe this enterprise in terms of ‘a preoccupation 
with discovering and setting out in a coherent fashion the principles underlying what would often be a vast mass of 
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Interestingly, Blackstone devised a scheme for carving up the law which has long since 
lapsed into desuetude (using categories like ‘the rights of persons’, and ‘the rights of things’). 
However, the fact that his scheme is no longer in use does not necessarily imply that it was flawed 
in some way. It is simply that he classified branches of the law in a way that is no longer popular. 
What this alerts us to is two key points: the fact that there is no a priori right or wrong way to carve 
up the law, and the fact that any given case or rule of law could, in theory, be housed in more than 
one legal category so long as the categories in question do not belong to the same classificatory 
scheme.   
This is possible because not all classificatory schemes share the same ambition. One might, 
for example, with very limited ambition, seek simply to distinguish statutory law from the common 
law, or domestic law from supra-national law, or public law from private law. With divisions of 
this kind, there is no reason why a particular tort case cannot form part of the common law 
category, the domestic law category, and the private law category.  However, this observation does 
not assist us with the question of whether legal categories belonging to the same classificatory 
scheme may overlap. Take, for example, the classificatory scheme frequently used in relation to 
the law of obligations. Here we encounter the familiar categories of contract, torts, equity and 
unjust enrichment.64 These legal categories have a markedly different relationship to one another 
than exists between categories like private law and statutory law. Whereas private law and statutory 
law belong to different classificatory schemes and are not mutually exclusive, the same cannot be said 
of contract, torts, equity and unjust enrichment. In theory these represent distinct sub-sets of the 
higher-level legal category: the law of obligations. They are distinct from, yet complement, one 
another in the same way that private law is distinct from, yet complements, public law, and 
statutory law comes apart from, yet complements, the common law. 
The sub-divisions within a particular classificatory scheme are easily understood: they are 
each constructed according to, and therefore reflect, some or other principle or criterion that is 
particular to that sub-category. For example, we might take as our starting category, the statutory 
laws of the last three centuries. We may then seek to divide these laws into three separate sub-
categories. The first might comprise the statutory laws of the 19th Century; the second, the statutory 
laws of the 20th Century; and the third, the statutory laws of the 21st Century. No single statute 
could conceivably be housed in more than one of the sub-categories. 
More pertinently, we could start with the law of obligations and attempt to sub-divide this 
into the aforementioned sub-categories of contract, torts, equity and unjust enrichment. In each 
case, the question of where to place a given case or rule would be answered not, as under the 
previous scheme, by reference to the century in which it was decided, but by reference to some 
central juridical criterion which forms the hallmark of one or other of the sub-categories. The 
criterion of mistaken payments, for example, is widely treated as the organising principle behind 
the category of unjust enrichment.  
Importantly, one consequence of treating certain juridical features as definitive in this way 
is that a given case ought, in theory, to belong to just one of the four named sub-categories.65 If 
the case is characterised by a mistaken payment, then it belongs in the box labelled ‘unjust 
enrichment’ and not the box labelled ‘contract’ or the one labelled ‘torts’. In order to appreciate 
why this is so, it is necessary to make an important observation concerning the nature of the four 
sub-categories within the law of obligations. It is this. Unlike the major categories within the 
                                                          
relevant cases’: N Duxbury, Frederick Pollock and the English Juristic Tradition (Oxford: OUP, 2004) 188. See also, D 
Sugarman, ‘Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind and the Making of the Textbook Tradition’ in W Twining (ed), 
Legal Theory and Common Law (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).  
64 This last example draws on, but is a greatly simplified version of, the legal taxonomy offered by the late Professor 
Peter Birks: see, P Birks, ‘The Concept of a Civil Wrong’ in DG Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford: 
OUP, 1995) 31-33. That these are now widely recognised legal categories is a fact to which the large array of 
commensurately titled student textbooks, university courses and practitioner’s treatises readily testify. 
65 Occasionally, a case may display more than one set of key, juridical features. In such instances, pleading in the 
alternative (eg, as either a both breach of contract or as a tort) may be possible: see text associated with (n 109). 
12 
 
Blackstonian scheme, the sub-categories contract, torts, equity and unjust enrichment fulfil 
important dispositive functions and are, for this reason, appropriately described as dispositive legal 
categories. 66  
At the heart of a dispositive legal category is a core juridical feature (or set of features). It is 
this core feature (or set of features) which gives the category both its conceptual unity and its 
practical utility.67 Thus, when practitioners treat a case as belonging to a particular legal category, 
they do so because they think that it bears particular juridical attributes.68 In turn, their presentation 
of the case in this way – as belonging to category X – will determine the way in which it is handled 
by the courts. As Charlie Webb puts it, ‘the classification of a case must tell us something about 
how the law should respond to it: what set of rules and principles we apply to it, what questions 
we ask and what tests we use’.69 So, for example, if a case of inducing breach of contract with an 
international dimension is presented as a tort case rather than a contract case, it will attract the 
application of the choice of law rules applicable to torts rather than those applicable to contract.70 
Similarly, a purely domestic case of inducing breach of contract will necessitate the application of 
the tort (not the contract) rules on limitation.71  
The crucial point is this. Since the sub-categories within the law of obligations fulfil this 
dispositive function, they will in theory derive conceptual unity from a particular juridical core.72 
Birks thought that he had identified such a core within tort law when he wrote (using the term 
‘wrongs’ in preference to that of ‘tort’73) that, ‘the only definitively essential feature of a wrong is 
that it is conduct which attracts its legal consequences by virtue of its character as a breach of a 
primary duty’.74 Notice that this conception of what belongs in the category ‘wrongs’ is a specifically 
juridical one.75 It looks to the specific, narrow question of whether a primary duty has been 
breached.  
                                                          
66 The fact that they serve as dispositive legal categories does not exclude their expository uses. There is no necessary 
tension between the two types of category. Indeed, when legal education was in its infancy, legal publishers were 
‘preoccupied with the needs of practitioners’: Sugarman (n 63) 52. Jurists, too, were concerned to provide practising 
lawyers with reliable guides to the law: see Duxbury (n 63) 245. On the other hand, many modern expository categories 
cannot be put to dispositive ends. And they have not been designed to do so. For details, see C Webb ‘Treating Like 
Cases Alike: Principle and Classification in Private Law’ in A Robertson and TH Wu (eds), The Goals of Private Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 217-9.  
67 Peter Jaffey labels categories constructed in this way ‘justificatory categories’ because, he argues, such categories 
‘justify the common treatment of claims in terms of a common framework for determining when a claim arises’: P 
Jaffey, ‘Classification and Unjust Enrichment’ (2004) 67 MLR 1012, 1030. 
68 On the requirement of practitioners to do this, see Ibbetson (n 45) 171-2. 
69 Webb (n 66) 220.  
70 See AMT Futures Ltd v Marzillier [2017] UKSC 13. 
71 One segment of the Limitation Act 1980 (comprising ss2-4A) has the heading ‘Actions founded on tort’ while 
another segment (comprising ss 5-7) is labelled ‘Actions founded on contract’.  
72 No such juridical imperative holds sway in relation to some expository legal categories, such as family law and 
medical law. These legal categories may perfectly well derive their conceptual unity from an organising idea that is 
contextual in nature (eg, the existence of a familial link between the principal litigants, or the prominence of a health 
care issue).  
73 I acknowledge that, for Birks, an action for damages for a breach of contract would fall within the category ‘wrongs’ 
(whereas actions for specific performance would be treated as falling within the category ‘consents’). Yet nothing turns 
on this for present purposes. We are only interested here in the question of whether the various categories of 
obligations can overlap rather than with which particular actions fall within each category. In any case, Birks himself 
intimated that the terms ‘torts’ and ‘wrongs’ when gave the second category in his fourfold classification the the title 
‘Torts (Wrongs) – Category 2’: see Birks (n 64) 47.  
74 P Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 Western Australian L Rev 1, 40 (emphasis 
added). In similar vein, the thing that enables his second category, ‘consents’, to accommodate an action for specific 
performance (but not one for breach of contract) is the fact that this category centres upon the primary (not secondary, 
remedial) contractual duty.  
75 Birks himself suggested that his scheme was based on different types of factual events. But for the compelling 
argument that ‘legal rights and duties do not arise from raw and unreconstructed happenings in the physical world, 
but from an interpretation of those physical happenings within the intellectual framework of the law’ (giving Birks’ 
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Much as Birks thought that wrongs comprised ‘a distinct category of obligation-creating 
event’,76 it is doubtful whether matters are quite that simple. In common law jurisdictions where 
there exists a multiplicity of different torts (as opposed to the simple idea of tortious wrongdoing 
that one finds in Continental legal systems77), tort law lacks the kind of conceptual unity that Birks 
and some of my target theorists would have us believe.78 There is no simple juridical core that can 
be identified. Not only are torts notoriously heterogeneous in this respect,79 but there are also 
many well-established mongrel actions that, regardless of the fact that they are uniformly treated 
as torts, call into play touchstones of liability more readily associated with more than one legal 
category. These hybrid torts militate against the idea that there exists a body of law that can be 
sharply defined in juridical terms in the way suggested by the theorists in view. In so doing, they 
undermine the very foundations of those theories. 
 
 




As observed earlier, dispositive legal categories which belong to the same classificatory scheme should in 
theory be discrete. At the heart of any such legal category is an organising, juridical principle (or 
set of such principles); and it is the application of this principle (or set of principles) to all cases 
within the category that ensures, in line with the rule of law, that like cases are treated alike. As was 
also noted above, when such organising principles are used in order to classify cases, any given 
case ought to belong to just one such category. Webb, making much the same observation, explains 
the matter this way: 
 
if cases within different classes will fall to be dealt with differently [ie, according to a particular organising 
principle or set of such principles], then it makes no sense to say that a case can fall within, or straddle, 
more than one category.80  
  
The logic behind Webb’s claim is impeccable. But the observation pays no regard to the fact that 
theory and practice often come apart. So, whatever we might say in theoretical terms about legal 
categories and the cases they house, we would be naïve to expect reality to be a perfect reflection 
of what theory dictates. Classificatory schemes, like the judgments to which they are applied, are 
human constructs. Like most such constructs, they frequently fall short of the ideal. So, from time 
to time we come across cases that (whether by design or by accident), cannot be slotted 
comfortably within the various conceptions of tort law proffered by our target theorists. These 
actions – though widely recognised as torts – bear obvious mongrel traits. 
I have noted already the way in which the inducing breach of contract has an equally strong 
juridical affinity with contract as it does with tort. But it is by no means alone in blurring the 
boundary between contract and tort. And nor is this boundary the only one that gets blurred. As 
                                                          
scheme a juridical, as opposed to a factual, basis), see RB Grantham and CEF Rickett, ‘Property Rights as a Legally 
Significant Event’ [2003] CLJ 717, 722-3. 
76 Birks (n 64) 51. 
77 Cf France (where the idea of tort is that of la responsabilité extracontractuelle); Germany (die unerlaubte Handlung) and 
Switzerland (les actes illicites). 
78 For a thoroughgoing analysis of Birks’ work in this regard, as well as the work of others who maintain (and deny) 
that rigid categories can be found within the law of obligations, see S Waddams (n 43) passim. 
79 Most obviously, liability bases vary from intentional wrongdoing (at one end of the spectrum, through fault-based 
liability (in the middle) to strict liability (at the other end).  
80 Webb (n 66) 220. Webb accepts that certain cases are capable of what Peter Birks called alternative analysis. Yet this 
does not undermine his claim, since the only reason these exceptional cases can be analysed in two different ways is 
because they contain an array of potentially significant features, only some of which are relevant to action x, and others 
of which are relevant to action y. For details, see below, n 109. 
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we shall see, many of tort law’s boundaries with neighbouring legal categories81 are affected in this 
way by hybrid torts. So the point is inevitably reached where it becomes irresistible to conclude 
that tort law is not a discrete, sharply-defined legal category with a sufficiently distinctive juridical 
core to support a neat and tidy theory of the same.  
 
 
B The Prevalence of Hybrid Torts 
 
Sometimes, the way in which certain causes of action get classified seems to be attributable to the 
way in which influential jurists have interpreted key cases. For example, FH Newark elaborated a 
well-known account of the supposedly close relationship between the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and 
the law of private nuisance. This account played a major role in causing the judiciary to treat the 
former, many years later, as nothing more than a sub-branch of the latter.82 In his speech in 
Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc, Lord Goff quoted with approval a lengthy passage 
from Newark’s article in which the latter had asserted that ‘Rylands v Fletcher [is] a simple case of 
nuisance’.83 Some years later, in Transco Plc v Stockport MBC, Lord Hoffmann likewise admitted that 
he was merely ‘[a]dopting the opinion of Professor Newark … that the novel feature of Rylands v 
Fletcher was to create liability for an “isolated” (ie unforeseeable) escape’, but that Rylands ‘was 
nevertheless founded on the principles of nuisance’.84 So, although some jurists contend that the 
rule does not, because of certain important peculiarities, form part of tort law,85 the orthodox view 
is clear. The rule is formally not just part of tort law but, more specifically, part of the law of private 
nuisance.86 Ultimately, it is Newark’s treatment of the case all those years ago that seems to be 
responsible for this conception.87 
Jurists are not alone, however, in making controversial classificatory decisions that have this 
effect. Occasionally, it is the courts themselves that must shoulder the responsibility. For, as 
Stephen Smith has observed, it is sometimes the case that ‘legal decisions themselves tell us how 
they are to be classified and categorised – whether they are tort cases, contract cases or whatever’.88 
All that is required is that the relevant court declares a certain case to be part of tort law and, hey 
presto, thus is born a new ‘tort’ even if in truth the decision is only partly (or minimally) explicable 
in terms of familiar touchstones of tortious liability.89 We can once again invoke Lumley v Gye as an 
example.  
Although the question that arose in Lumley was a novel one involving accessory (not primary) 
liability, Erle J did at one point in his judgment say that, ‘[i]t was undoubtedly prima facie an 
unlawful act on the part of Miss Wagner to break her contract, and therefore a tortious act of the 
                                                          
81 At a low level of classification, tort law ought, in theory, to be discrete from contract, equity etc, as these all belong 
to the same scheme, namely, the one according to which the law of obligations is carved up. At a higher level of 
classification, however, tort law – as part of private law – ought to be distinct also from public law and European law, 
both of which (along with private law) comprise parts of a different classificatory scheme. 
82 FH Newark, ‘The Boundaries of Nuisance’ (1949) 65 LQR 445, 487-8. 
83 [1994] 2 AC 264, 298. Even before this, in Read v Lyons, Lord Simmonds had noted (and seemed influenced by) the 
fact that ‘text-books on the law of nuisance regard cases coming under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher’: [1947] AC 156, 
183.  
84 [2004] 2 AC 1, [33].  
85 See, eg, NJ McBride and R Bagshaw, Tort Law (6th ed, London: Pearson, 2018) 445. 
86 The view that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is but a sub-branch of the law of private nuisance was unequivocally 
endorsed by the House of Lords in Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] UKHL 9. 
87 For more recent scholarship that takes issue with Newark’s conception, see D Nolan, ‘The Distinctiveness of Rylands 
v Fletcher’ (2005) 121 LQR 121; J Murphy, ‘The Merits of Rylands v Fletcher’ (2004) 24 OJLS 643. 
88 S Smith, ‘Taking Law Seriously’ (2000) 50 UTLJ 241, 250. 
89 Though not strictly relevant here, it is also interesting to note, en passant, that the Birksian idea that consent is the 
organizing concept at the heart of contract law may also be doubted. In contract law, consent is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient touchstone. It is not necessary since certain statutory implied terms will imposed upon contracting 
parties even if they object to them. And it is not sufficient since there must always be consideration in order for a 
contract to be binding.  
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defendant maliciously to procure her to do so’.90 Of course, his having said this is hard to square 
with that part of his dictum (considered earlier) in which he suggested that the defendant might 
somehow be jointly liable in contract for the breach that occurred.91 Equally, it is less than obvious 
why it necessarily follows from the fact that X has broken a contract with Z that Y (who procured 
that breach) should be considered a tortfeasor. But that is not the point. What is important is the 
fact that, ultimately, Erle J declared that the defendant was a tortfeasor. And in so saying, his 
Lordship provided a clear steer as to how cases of inducing breach of contract should be treated 
in the future. Ever since that landmark decision, Lumley v Gye has almost universally been regarded 
as establishing a form of tortious liability; and this is despite the fact that its hybrid nature has by 
no means gone unnoticed.  
For example, in his discussion of Lumley in OBG Ltd v Allan, Lord Hoffmann acknowledged 
the mongrel nature of inducing breach of contract. He traced the tort’s origins to an ‘old action 
on the case for enticing away someone else’s servant’ and noted that, in such cases, the only means 
by which a claimant could be granted a remedy against the person who induced the servant’s 
breach of contract was by recourse to a certain ‘mixing and matching of the forms of action’.92 
Even so, Lord Hoffmann was content ultimately to continue to treat inducing breach of contract 
as part of tort law. A sizeable section of his leading speech in OBG was headed ‘Inducing breach 
of contract: elements of the Lumley v Gye tort’;93 and the phrase ‘Lumley v Gye tort’ was used no 
fewer than 12 times in his speech as a whole. 
The remainder of this section considers numerous other causes of action that are almost 
always regarded as part of tort law but which, in truth, have hybrid rather than pedigree 
characteristics. They are addressed according the various boundaries that they tend to obfuscate. 
 
 
1. Tort and Contract 
 
A relatively modern development within tort law has been the preparedness of the courts to ascribe 
a duty of care in negligence on the basis of an assumption of responsibility by the defendant. This 
branch of the law of negligence has its origins in the principle first enunciated in Hedley Byrne & 
Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd.94 As a subspecies of negligence, one might suppose that these 
assumption of responsibility cases would occupy a position at the heart of ‘tort law’. It would be a 
mistake, however, to think of them in this way. In Hedley Byrne itself, Lord Devlin was keenly aware 
of the juridical propinquity of the case to contract law in which, of course, duties arising from a 
voluntary assumption of responsibility find their natural home. He specifically referred to the fact 
that the case before him was almost contractual in nature.95 
The proximity of the Hedley Byrne principle to the law of contract was also noted in the later 
case of White v Jones96 where a solicitor negligently delayed carrying out a testator’s instructions to 
amend his will. This delay resulted in financial disappointment for the intended legatees in whose 
favour the will should have been (but never was) amended prior to the testator’s death. Ultimately, 
the case was treated as a further extension to the law of negligence. But notably, the Law Lords 
(some of whom explored this possibility at length), were acutely aware that the case might 
conceivably have been resolved by way of an extension to the law of contract. In particular, they 
                                                          
90 (1853) 2 El & Bl 216, 228. 
91 See text following n 48. 
92 [2008] 1 AC 1, [4]. 
93 ibid [39]. 
94 [1964] AC 465. 
95 ‘[B]ut for the absence of consideration’, he remarked, ‘there would have been a contract’ here: ibid 529. For a 
powerful critique of the treatment of assumed responsibility cases as negligence law, see K Barker, ‘Unreliable 
Assumptions in the Modern Law of Negligence’ (1993) 109 LQR 461, 464. See also, M Bridge, ‘The Overlap of Tort 
and Contract’ (1982) 27 McGill LJ 872.  
96 [1995] 2 AC 207. 
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made mention of the following juridical affinities with contract: the fact that the duty in question 
was (1) affirmative, not negative, in nature (2) founded upon an assumed responsibility, and (3) 
designed to protect an expectation interest.97  
As noted already, all of our target theorists concede that it is in the sphere of contract, not 
tort, that one finds duties that are voluntarily assumed. They could, of course, point to the fact 
that in some (but by no means all) of the assumed responsibility cases the relevant duty was merely 
deemed to have been assumed, rather than consciously shouldered.98 Yet this only provides a partial 
response, since it only accounts for some of the cases.  And even then, it is only a response available 
to non-Kantians (which is not to say that all non-Kantians consider White v Jones to be 
unproblematic99).  
The reason why Kantians cannot invoke the response just mentioned stems from the fact 
that, even if the relevant duty was in fact deemed to have been assumed, it remains inexplicable by 
virtue of being affirmative in nature. To explain: affirmative duties are regarded as being 
incompatible with the principle of Kantian right insofar as they instantiate an obligation to 
promote another’s welfare (rather than merely protect an equal right of independence in that 
person). In this regard, Weinrib is adamant that ‘private law deems no aspect of [the claimant’s] 
welfare important enough to ground a positive obligation to forward it’.100 It is for this reason that 
he denies the existence of liability for nonfeasance in tort law.  
Allan Beever is in agreement with Weinrib on this score,101 and in an attempt to head off the 
challenge for his theory presented by the assumption of responsibility cases, he argues that it is 
preferable to treat cases like White v Jones as belonging to a category of law best labelled ‘consents’.102 
He does not believe that they can be slotted into the law of contract because of the absence of 
consideration; but he argues strenuously that they have been wrongly pigeon-holed as part of the 
law of negligence. This mischaracterisation, he contends, is due to the fact that there is a widely 
held, yet ultimately mistaken, belief that ‘it is acceptable to inflict upheaval on the law of negligence 
but not on the law of contract’.103 Even so, it is clear that he sees these ‘consents’ cases as being 
closer to contract law than tort. He takes the view that the doctrine of consideration – a mere 
‘idiosyncrasy of the common law’104 – is all that stands in the way of treating such cases as quotidian 
contract cases.  
Beever is assuredly right that there is a general preference to use tort rather than contract in 
order to accommodate hybrid actions. And he may well be right, too, that the doctrine of 
consideration has relatively little going for it in theoretical terms. But neither point is relevant here. 
What matters for present purposes is that the assumption of responsibility cases blur the boundary 
between contract and tort in a way that many tort theorists either overlook or choose not to 
                                                          
97 ibid, 258, 268 and 269.  
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AC 605, 628 (Lord Roskill); Smith v Bush [1990] 1 A.C. 831, 862 (Lord Griffiths). 
99 Stevens, for example, variously describes the case as ‘anomalous’, an ‘exceptional award’ and ‘sui genereis’: see Stevens 
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acknowledge.105 They blur this boundary by virtue of the fact that some of the relevant touchstones 
of liability have an obvious affinity with contract while others seem more naturally aligned with 
tort. So, for all that we may say that the solicitor in White v Jones owed a duty of care, and that this 
duty was broken by virtue of the defendant’s negligence (classic ‘tort-speak’), we may equally well 
advert to the fact that the duty in play was voluntarily assumed and that the damages awarded were 
granted in order to repair a pure economic loss in the form of the claimants’ dashed expectations 
(classic ‘contract-speak’). 
The significance of looking forwards in order to gauge expectation losses is not to be 
underestimated. Both corrective justice theorists and rights theorists look backwards, to what went 
wrong, when it comes to gauging tort damages.106 The rights theorist is principally concerned to 
address the rights infringement that has occurred,107 while the corrective justice theorist – as the 
name suggests – regards tort damages as the means by which the injustice that has been visited 
upon the claimant is corrected. Expectation losses, by contrast, do not aim to restore the claimant 
to the position that occupied before the wrong in question was committed. They seek to place the 
claimant in the position that he expected to occupy at some point in the future.108  
In addition, it is vital to note that White v Jones cannot be explained away on the basis of what 
Peter Birks called ‘alternative analysis’ (ie, affording salience to different aspects of any given case 
so as to enable it to be dealt with either as a tort case (drawing on facets A, B and C) or as a 
contract case (drawing on facets X, Y and Z)).109 It cannot be so analysed because the factors that 
were treated as salient in White v Jones were the self-same factors that would have animated a 
contract action: the voluntary assumption of responsibility; the omission to fulfil the duty thereby 
created; and the need to repair the claimants’ damaged expectations. Put bluntly, White v Jones had 
but one set of liability touchstones. 
Another example of a cause of action that is typically regarded as part of the law of torts, 
but which might just as well be seen through the lens of contract law, is the ‘tort’ of two-party 
intimidation.110 In Kolmar Group AG v Traxpo Enterprises Pvt Ltd,111 the defendant coerced the 
claimant (with whom it had a contract) into paying a higher price for various goods than had 
originally been agreed. At one point in his judgment Clarke J observed: ‘I am quite satisfied … that 
Kolmar agreed to amend the letters of credit to increase the price ... as a result of illegitimate 
pressure amounting to economic duress on the part of Traxpo’.112 He went on: 
 
                                                          
105 Cf Nicholas McBride who acknowledges the difficulty of placing assumed responsibility cases into one of the 
familiar legal categories. He writes, ‘duties of care arising under Hedley Byrne exist in an awkward space between 
imposed obligations – breach of which normally amounts to a tort – and contractual obligations’: NJ McBride, The 
Humanity of Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019) ch 1 (forthcoming). 
106 All of our target theorists accept that the restitutio in integrum principle occupies centre stage in tort law. Weinrib, for 
example, is adamant that ‘tort law places the defendant under the obligation to restore the plaintiff, so far as possible, 
to the position the plaintiff would have been in had the wrong not been committed’ (Weinrib n 1, (Idea of Private Law) 
135). Likewise, Stevens speaks of damages ‘replicating the position before the wrong’ (Stevens n 1, 59) 
107 For Stevens, for example, damages are seen principally in terms of their being ‘awarded as a “next best” substitute 
for the primary right’ that was infringed: Stevens (n 1) 60.  He also concedes, however, that they can also be awarded 
(secondarily) ‘to eradicate a consequential economic loss’: ibid, 59. 
108 They are therefore not the norm in tort cases: see Waddams (n 43) 156. Note also the hostility of La Forest J 
towards granting tort claimants damages based on disappointed expectations regarding the quality of work in the 
construction of defective (but not dangerous) property in Winnipeg Condominium Corporation No 36 v Bird Construction Co 
[1995] 1 SCR 85, 120.   
109 According to Birks, ‘alternative analyses select different aspects of the facts and thus depict different causative events… 
[Yet] it is no more possible for the selected causative event to be both an unjust enrichment and a tort than it is for 
an animal to be both an insect and a mammal’: P Birks, ‘Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment’ (2001) 79 
Texas L Rev 1767, 1781 (emphasis added). 
110 For a fuller account of this tort and of the extent to which it overlaps with contract law, see J Murphy, 
‘Understanding Intimidation’ (2014) 77 MLR 33, 49-57. 
111 [2010] 1 CLC 256. 
112 ibid [93]. 
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The tort of intimidation is established where (i) the defendant makes a demand backed by a coercive and 
unlawful threat; (ii) the plaintiff complies with that demand because of the coercive and unlawful threat; (iii) 
the defendant knows or should have known that compliance with its demand will cause loss and damage to 
the plaintiff and (iv) the defendant intends its demand to cause loss and damage to the plaintiff … Those 
requirements are, as it seems to me, satisfied … [and] [a]ccordingly, Kolmar is entitled to $1,405,566.61 as 
damages for intimidation.113 
 
It seems a matter of mere fortuity that the judge ultimately preferred to anchor his judgement to 
the tort of intimidation rather than, more simply, the juridical fact of economic duress (which he 
treated as the basis of the tort). The centrality of economic duress to the decision he reached 
suggests that the case could equally well have been dealt with according to a familiar set of contract 
law rules. Indeed, at one point in his judgment Clarke J even indicated as much.114 In fact, perhaps 
the oddest facet of the case is that the judge ultimately plumped for imposing tortious liability. 
After all, the continued vitality of two-party intimidation had been specifically called into question 
just a few years earlier by the House of Lords in OBG v Allan.115 As it stands, however, Kolmar 
provides a further example of a cause of action that is treated as tortious, but which draws heavily 
upon juridical ideas more typically associated with a different legal category. And in common with 
the assumed responsibility cases, Kolmar is not susceptible to Birksian ‘alternative analysis’.116 
Whether addressed from a tort or a contract perspective, it is the self-same juridical feature – 
namely, ‘illegitimate pressure amounting to economic duress’ – that is ultimately pivotal.  
The preceding paragraphs advert to just a few instances in which it is impossible fully to 
disentangle contract and tort. There is, however, nothing very new or isolated about these 
examples.117 Nor, apart from a desire for theoretical neatness, is there any basis for regarding them 
as anomalous. Tortious assumed responsibility cases have consistently been endorsed at the 
highest judicial level,118 while the tort of two-party intimidation seems also to have survived the 
questions raised about its vitality in OBG Ltd v Allan.119 There is, consequently, no doubt that the 
border between tort and contract is blurred in the law as we find it. And however much we may 
think that tort and contract should come apart neatly (in accordance with theory), it is at least 
noteworthy that Lord Goff cautioned his fellow judges against the ‘temptation of elegance’ in 
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No 1).120 
 
 
2. Tort and Equity 
 
A prime example of the overlap that exists between tort and equity can be seen in the developing 
law on the misuse of private information. This body of law is hard to place in any single legal 
category since it has a pretty firm foothold in both tort and equity. On the one hand, the modern 
action in England for misuse of private information has its origins in the equitable wrong of breach 
of confidence.121 Yet, on the other, it is nowadays often treated as part of the law of torts. This 
                                                          
113 ibid [119]-[121] (Clarke J). 
114 ibid at [93]. 
115 See OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1, [61] (Lord Hoffmann).  
116 See above (n 109).  
117 See, eg, Charles Addison’s reference to ‘Tort founded on Contract’ (in CG Addison, Wrongs and Their Remedies 
(London: V and R Stevens and Sons, 1864) 12), or Arthur Underhill’s reference to ‘Quasi-Torts’ (in A Underhill, 
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119 For details of the tort’s vitality in the wake of OBG v Allan, see Murphy (n 110). 
120 [1995] 2 AC 145, 186. Rather, he said, ‘there is no sound basis for a rule which automatically restricts the claimant 
to either a tortious or a contractual remedy’: ibid 193. 
121 The equivalent development in Canada (formulated in Tsige v Jones [2012] ONCA 32) is also arguably something of 
a hybrid in that its development was premised on Charter rights rather than common law rights. For detailed discussion 
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latter characterisation of the action owes a great deal to the speech of Lord Nicholls in Campbell v 
MGN Ltd.122 For there, after noting the way in which the action had ‘shaken off the limiting 
constraint of the need for an initial confidential relationship’123 – which was a key touchstone of 
the equitable action for breach of confidence – his Lordship went on to state that ‘the tort is better 
encapsulated now as a misuse of private information’.124 Although Lord Nicholls was admittedly 
in a minority of one in describing the action in this way, there has since been considerable judicial 
endorsement of the view that a new kind of tort action has materialised which is based on the 
misuse of private information.125  
Such endorsement does much to settle the question of whether this action is rightly called a 
tort; but it is also important to notice its hybrid qualities. The fact that textbooks and treatises on 
both the law of torts and equity now fully discuss this form of civil liability is of course suggestive 
but not definitive.126 Much more telling is the fact that senior judges have revealed their willingness 
to treat the action as one within tort law while continuing to rely on touchstones of liability that 
include the quintessentially equitable consideration of whether the claimant behaved in an 
iniquitous way so as to deny her the reasonable expectation of privacy.127 
Further areas of overlap between tort law and equity arise in the context of the common law 
action for passing off as well as in relation to the various statutory causes of action for infringement 
of intellectual property rights (such as breach of copyright and patent infringement). While all such 
actions are, again, habitually regarded as torts,128 it is notable that the first choice of remedy in such 
cases will often be an account of profits and/or an injunction to restrain further infringements of 
the claimant’s rights. These remedies are, of course, equitable ones; and this only adds to the 
suggestion that these actions have as close an affinity with equity as they do with tort. Nor are they 
alone or anomalous in this respect. The liability imposed upon an accessory for knowing assistance 
in the breach of a fiduciary obligation (which obligation lies in equity) has also been judicially 
described as an ‘equitable tort’;129 and the decision in A-G v Blake130 suggested a fairly sizeable range 
of circumstances in which an account of profits might be available in tort law.131  
 
 
3.  Tort and Property Law132 
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One important overlap between tort and property law exists in the shape of the action for 
conversion. The problems presented by this tort for those who seek to theorise gain-based 
damages and the limits of restitution are fairly well known. But for present purposes it is only the 
way in which it blurs the boundary between tort and property law that warrants attention.133  
Where D1 steals C’s coat and sells it to D2, one remedial option open to C is to sue for re-
delivery of the coat. This claim is founded upon C’s possessory rights over the coat. It is a claim 
made directly against D2. It can be distinguished from the alternative remedy of damages which 
attends to the fact that C has suffered a loss by virtue of D1’s wrongdoing. Where C elects to claim 
re-delivery of the coat, the tort of conversion acts, according to Andrew Tettenborn, ‘as a kind of 
surrogate vindicatio, allowing owners to get back their property ... from a wrongful possessor’.134 
Putting it this way illuminates the fact that – when re-delivery is sought – conversion is capable of 
being seen as a proprietary cause of action. In Tettenborn’s view: 
 
It is not really tort but personal property law; it affords not so much reparation for wrongful dealing, as 
machinery for an owner to get his property back. The law of obligations simply does … what in other 
systems is achieved by a separate proprietary cause of action.135 
  
The point is a fair one. However, when a claimant invokes the fact that he has suffered a loss and 
sues for damages, conversion operates in a typically tortious way. The truth about conversion, 
then, is that it comprises another hybrid tort. The key touchstone of possession is a quintessentially 
proprietary one. Furthermore, in line with the other hybrid actions considered above, the material 
events in a case of conversion are incapable of being explained away according to Birksian 
‘alternative analysis’. This is because the very same element – the non-consensual using, taking, 
retention or delivery to a third party of the chattel in question – is juridically significant whether 






4. Tort and Unjust Enrichment 
 
The tort of conversion also blurs the dividing line between tort law and unjust enrichment. It is 
uncontroversial that if D hands over to X goods belonging to C in respect of which C has a right 
to immediate possession, D will commit the tort of conversion.136 It is equally trite to state that a 
failure to hand over goods to someone who has an immediate right to possess them also commits 
conversion.137 One would have thought, then, that a case like Chesworth v Farrar138 – in which the 
executors of an estate of a deceased antique dealer who had both lost and sold certain goods 
belonging to the claimants – ought to have been resolved squarely on the basis of the tort of 
conversion. However, Edmund-Davies J remarked as follows: 
 
                                                          
that property law claims can be grouped together according to a specific kind of causative event overlooked by Birks 
– the invalid transfer).  
133 This matter is of significance so long as one sees property law as a sub-category within private law that is discrete 
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134 A Tettenborn, ‘Conversion, Tort and Restitution’ in N Palmer and E McKendrick (eds), Interests in Goods (2nd ed, 
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135 A Tettenborn, ‘Damages in Conversion: The Exception or the Anomaly?’ [1993] CLJ 128. 
136 See, eg, Hollins v Fowler (1875) LR 7 HL 757. 
137 See, eg, Howard E Perry & Co Ltd v British Railways Board [1980] 1 WLR 1375.  
138 [1967] QB 407. 
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A person upon whom a tort has been committed has at times a choice of alternative remedies, even though 
it is a sine qua non regarding each that he must establish that a tort has been committed. He may sue to 
recover damages for the tort, or he may waive the tort and sue in quasi-contract to recover the benefits 
received by the wrongdoer.139 
 
In so saying, his Lordship made clear his belief that the facts in Chesworth were capable of grounding 
either an action in tort or one in quasi-contract. This was important in the case itself since an action 
in tort was time-barred. But it was also important more generally, since granting the claimant a 
choice as to cause of action is qualitatively different from seeing conversion as something that is 
purely a tort that makes available different types of remedy. More simply, on Edmund-Davies J’s 
understanding, Chesworth need not necessarily be treated as a tort case.140 He could scarcely have 
been clearer when he said that a claimant in such circumstances is free to ‘waive the tort and sue 
in quasi-contract’.141 So long as the claimant adverts to the fact that the defendant has been unjustly 
enriched, the case, he said, could proceed along the lines of quasi-contract (a category of law that 
broadly equates with what would now call unjust enrichment).  
There is, however, a possible snag here. For it might still be said that Chesworth does not really 
blur the boundary between tort law and unjust enrichment. It might merely be a case of concurrent 
liability that is susceptible to alternative analysis: one, in other words, in which highlighting two 
different juridical aspects of the case (Birks used the language of causative events) would support two 
different types of action.142 But are there really two different juridical aspects to Chesworth such that 
there is no genuine threat to the idea that tort and unjust enrichment are quite separate legal 
categories? I don’t think that there are. 
It is true that, for the purposes of the tort of conversion, the claimant must point to the 
commission of a wrong. It is equally true that the commission of a wrong does not formally 
animate a claim in unjust enrichment. However, it is difficult to see how one could establish an 
unjust enrichment in a case like Chesworth without adverting to, and relying on, the self-same 
events/juridical features which illuminate the commission of a wrong. The event that grounds the 
wrong – the non-consensual transfer – is also what renders intelligible the claim that the transfer 
was a mistaken one, and thus one in which an action for unjust enrichment could be pursued. As 
Birks himself conceded, it is ‘the absence of [C’s] consent [which] supplies the unjust factor’.143 So 
whether it is viewed through the lens of tort law or that of unjust enrichment, it is the absence of 
consent in Chesworth which is key. It supplies both the wrongfulness demanded by tort, and the 
mistaken payment that is central to unjust enrichment. 
Accordingly, even if one accepts that, in theory, different aspects of the same case may support 
alternative forms of analysis (and thereby ground different causes of action), it is nonetheless true 
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that in Chesworth a single, common juridical feature was in play.144 And that being so, it is hard to 
see Chesworth as anything other than a hybrid case.145  
Nor is Chesworth unique in this regard, for much the same can be said in relation to cases of 
deceit.146 It is precisely because D (acting wrongfully) manages to deceive C into handing over his 
money that C can be said to have been mistaken in handing over that money. And it is not just the 
causative event that may be viewed through the lens of unjust enrichment in a deceit case. The 
same is true also of the damages payable. As Lord Wright once put it: ‘in the case of fraud, the 
court will exercise its jurisdiction … to prevent the defendant from enjoying the benefit of his 
fraud’.147 In other words, despite the tort law norm of attending to what C has lost, the damages 
in such cases will be computed with an eye on the fact that D stands to be unjustly enriched. 
 
 
5. Tort and Public Law 
 
As noted already, there is no a priori right way to categorise the law, and divisions drawn along very 
broad lines – such as domestic law and international law, or private law and public law – are 
certainly possible. That said, the legal categories associated with such broad divisions are often too 
large to be useful for expository purposes. Accordingly, they are usually broken down further into 
a series of sub-categories. Tort is often regarded as one such sub-category within private law, and 
its status as such is something to which our target theorists subscribe, as we saw above.  
Conceived in this way, tort law ought not, in theory, to overlap with any other category within 
the classificatory scheme to which private law belongs. More concretely, tort law ought not to 
overlap with public law since private law and public law are separate (but complementary) parts of 
a single classificatory scheme. Yet in practice there are several hybrid torts which confound this 
dichotomy. 
One such hybrid tort is misfeasance in a public office. Unusually for a tort, this cause of 
action is animated by the infringement of a public, not a private, right. In the famous case of 
Roncarelli v Duplessis,148 for example, the defendant sought to deprive the claimant of something 
that the claimant only had by virtue of public law: a liquor licence. In recognition of this public 
law dimension to the tort, several scholars have been hazy in the way they describe it. RC Evans, 
for example, in recognition of its hybrid qualities, has dubbed it ‘an administrative tort’,149 while 
Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve describe it is as ‘the only specifically “public law” tort in 
English law’.150 Peter Cane and Donal Nolan also label it a ‘public law tort’,151 while for Simon 
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Dench, ‘[t]he tort of misfeasance … is a solely public law remedy’.152 If ever there were a hybrid tort, 
then this is surely it. It is certainly the case that it conflicts with the claim made by all of my target 
theorists that tort law is exclusively a part of private law and concerned solely with private rights. 
A second overlap between tort and public law occurs in certain common law jurisdictions 
where the breach of a particular constitutional and/or human rights guarantee is treated as a 
‘constitutional tort’.153 Just as with misfeasance in a public office, the difficulty with classifying such 
actions as thoroughbred torts (from the perspective of the theories in view, at least) inheres in the 
fact that such actions have nothing to do with the infringement of private law rights. Actions of 
this kind ground awards of ‘vindicatory damages’ in several common law jurisdictions. Damages 
for such actions are designed to reflect the fact that ‘the right violated was a constitutional right’.154 
 
 
VI Implications of Hybrid Torts for Explanatory Theories 
 
All of the hybrid torts outlined above present a significant problem of fit for at least one of the 
major explanatory theories of tort law under consideration. Some are even incompatible with all 
of these theories. The problem they present is that, together, they make it almost impossible to 
pin down exactly where the frontiers of tort law lie. In this regard, Wittgenstein’s aphorism, set 
out at the head of this article, becomes salient, for it is plainly the case that the more indistinct an 
object is, the more difficult it is to provide a clear and definitive theory of it. The more amorphous 
and juridically mixed tort law appears, the less it is amenable to reductive theorisation (in the sense 
that a single norm, principle or other core juridical feature can be said to animate it).  
As we have seen, hybrid torts are characterised by their mixed touchstones of liability.  In 
amongst typically tortious considerations we find interlopers like the proprietary concept of 
possession in the tort of conversion, the breach of contract requirement in the Lumley tort, and 
the relevance of a claimant’s iniquitous behaviour in a case of misuse of private information. None 
of these chime with Weinrib’s claim that torts can be characterised by a simple set of familiar 




It is one thing to point out that hybrid torts raise doubts about the widely held belief that tort law 
is a discrete legal category. It is quite another, however, to show that these doubts should be 
considered serious ones. If the extent of the boundary blurring for which they are responsible can 
be dismissed as trivial, or if the actions in question can be considered anomalous, then the 
plausibility of those theories which insist (and require) that tort law be a discrete body of law may 
nonetheless emerge relatively unscathed from the challenge posed by hybrid torts. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, then, these irrelevance claims are frequently made.  
Sometimes the irrelevance claim takes the form of a contention that a particular case was 
wrongly decided and that, as a consequence, the legal principle emanating from it should be 
regarded as a mistake. Such thinking seems to underpin Weinrib’s assertion that, ‘[i]nternal to the 
process of law is the incremental transformation or reinterpretation or even the repudiation of 
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specific decisions so as to make them conform to a wider pattern of coherence’.156 Yet there are 
limits to how readily this escape route – based on side-lining inconvenient decisions – can can be 
invoked. For one thing, the common law can only ‘work itself pure’157 within the accepted confines 
of the stare decisis principle.158 Also, even if there is something to be said for now and again 
dismissing as wrongheaded ‘particular holdings’, the sheer durability of certain cases and rules 
speaks powerfully against their plausibly being regarded as anomalies. Take for example the tort 
of misfeasance in a public office which has its roots in the ancient case of Ashby v White.159 This 
has often been said to be an anomalous tort. It was even singled out for possible abolition by the 
English Law Commission in fairly recent times. However, mindful of its longevity and the fact 
that numerous consultees defended its existence (on the basis that it ‘played a necessary role as a 
marker for particularly opprobrious action by public officials’160), the Commission abandoned any 
suggestion that it should be abolished.  
Equally, we ought to bear in mind here the communis error facit jus principle which has been 
endorsed by the courts on many occasions.161 This principle, it will be recalled, operates to confer 
juridical legitimacy on rules of law that have been invoked and applied many times even though, when 
first minted, they may have been considered misguided. Any legal system which purports to take seriously 
both precedent and stability in the law must find room for the communis error facit jus principle.162 
And it is just this principle which belies Allan Beever’s claim that ‘it is impossible to support the 
existence of a tort of inducing breach of contract’.163 The action has been around for a great many 
years; and it has become firmly embedded as a legitimate part of the law by virtue of its repeated 
usage.    
A second version of the irrelevance claim posits not that a certain case is wrong, but that a 
whole segment of the law has been created in error. Recall Weinrib’s claim that even an ‘extensive 
and ramified jurisprudence’ can be side-lined as anomalous in order to allow the law to work itself 
pure.  The problem with any such claim is that it invites us to consider a large number of cases as 
erroneous in one fell swoop. Yet the very fact that the number of cases is large speaks powerfully 
against doing this (at least if the objection is based on the fact that the area of law is at loggerheads 
with a particular theory). Of course a particular line of authority may clash with a grand explanatory 
theory. But when this happens – where, in other words, there is a very considerable gap between 
the explanandum and the explanans – it seems more appropriate to question not the correctness of 
the line of authority, but whether the theory was ever very satisfactory in terms of explaining all of 
the law.  
When a theorist suggests that an entire cause of action (rather than just an odd case) be 
abandoned, or suggests that it should be regarded as something other than a tort, her theory ceases 
to be explanatory and becomes prescriptive in nature.164 This transition into prescriptive writing 
can be seen at work in connection with the tort of public nuisance, described by certain rights 
theorists as an anomalous cause of action. Stevens, for example, makes exactly this claim when he 
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asserts ‘that public nuisance is sui generis’.165 In so saying, he seems happy to ignore the fact that 
public nuisance has been specifically endorsed as an extant tort at the very highest level, not just 
in one common law jurisdiction, but in many. So much, then, for his repeatedly saying that he aims 
to explain the law as we find it. Nor can it help him that certain writers suggest that public nuisance 
is not even a tort of any kind,166 let alone one that is an anomaly. Their doing so is equally countered 
by the fact that the courts have specifically labelled it a tort,167 and applied to it the tort rules on 
the limitation of actions.168  
As noted already, Beever engages in a similarly Procrustian manoeuvre in relation to 
negligence cases predicated upon an assumed responsibility. His preferred approach is to 
repackage them as part of what he wants to call the ‘law of consents’.169 He adopts this position in 
spite of the numerous judicial endorsements of such cases as part of the law of negligence, and it 
is consequently hard to consider his approach a genuine exercise in interpretive theory. 
Interpretative theory involves evincing the best interpretation possible of what the courts have said. 
But when the courts are crystal clear on a matter – as they have been in relation the category into 
which we must place assumed responsibility cases – it is hard to see how Beever finds conceptual 
space for the suggestion that they should be seen as part of a putative law of consents. The 
difficulty he faces on this front is only augmented once one recalls that he commits himself, in the 
construction of his theory, ‘to observ[ing] the way in which the judges developed their understandings 
of the case law … in order to produce a general account of the law’.170 A much more plausible 
understanding of his approach to these cases is that he simply resorts to prescriptive writing in 
order to avert their clashing with his theory. 
The third and final form in which an irrelevance claim may be made relies upon the idea of 
triviality. In this guise, the irrelevance claim asserts not that a rule of law is wrong, but that it is so 
inconsequential in either practical or theoretical terms that it may legitimately be treated as causing 
no (or only de minimis) embarrassment to the main tenets of a theory. Robert Stevens’ rights-based 
account of tort law again furnishes a good example. In Torts and Rights, he attempts to trivialise the 
tort of misfeasance in a public office in two stages. He begins by making the point that it is a tort 
‘of narrow scope’, a ‘public tort … of narrow compass’, ‘an exception… quite different from other 
torts’.171 And then, instead of acknowledging the significant revitalisation of the tort in two fairly 
recent House of Lords’ decisions,172 he prefers to portray these modern cases in negative terms. 
He asserts that, ‘[u]ntil relatively recently it [ie, misfeasance in a public office] could be treated as 
of mainly historical interest’.173 Beyond such simple affirmations, however, he does not stray. Yet 
if he hopes to make good his triviality claim, he must do more than affirm. Blunt and largely 
undefended assertions of this kind are a long way short of compelling, rigorously constructed 
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When theorizing category X, no necessary difficulty will be encountered by the fact that this 
category can be neatly disaggregated into a series of sub-categories such as X1, X2 and X3. So long 
as X1, X2 and X3 are all (1) discrete sub-categories of the broader category X, yet (2) related to one 
another in a particular way, and (3) demonstrably distinct from any other category of law from 
which category X is distinct, then the carving up of category X in this way ought to be 
uncontroversial. If, however, any of the conditions just described do not obtain, things will be very 
different. If sub-category X1, for example, in fact lies somewhere on the border between category 
X and category Y, such that it becomes hard or impossible to pin down where category X stops 
and category Y begins, then successfully theorizing category X in a way that claims or presupposes 
a clear distinction between categories X and Y will be rendered much more difficult (perhaps even 
impossible).  
If we now jettison the abstract idea of sub-category X1 and replace it with the various hybrid 
torts considered in this article, it becomes obvious that tort law (the equivalent of category X), 
cannot simply be said to be distinct from other familiar categories such as contract, unjust 
enrichment and equity. As a consequence of this, explanatory theories of tort which rely for 
plausibility on the foundational idea that it comprises a discrete body of law can be seen to founder. 
Not only do they fail to account satisfactorily for the sizeable range of significant hybrid torts that 
exist, they also fail to set clearly the four corners of their theory. 
A final thought is this. Though I doubt whether tort can ever be entirely disentangled from 
neighbouring categories of law, I do not in so saying imply that the category ‘tort law’ is either 
meaningless or useless. I acknowledge that the courts frequently refer to ‘tort law’ or ‘the law of 
torts’, and that so doing serves a number of useful practical purposes. I can also see how a rough-
edged conception of tort law is helpful to those engaged in teaching and learning the law. My claim 
is simply this: that the fuzziness of tort law’s borders significantly undermines the plausibility of 
my target theories. They are all explanatory theories purporting to offer a clear account of tort 
law’s nature and domain. They all treat tort as though it were a discrete body of law with sharply-
defined edges. Yet such treatment is unwarranted given the prevalence and effects of hybrid torts.  
